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SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT: 
SEX, GENDER AND THE DEFINITION OF 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1964, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, l 
which includes the following prohibition: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. . . .2 
This statute prohibits sex discrimination in employment. 
Compare the following statements of judicial interpretation of 
this statute: "Title VII was enacted in order to remove those 
artificial barriers to full employment which are based upon 
unjust and long-encrusted prejudice. Its aim is to make careers 
open to talents irrespective of ... sex."3 "The goal of Title VII is 
equal employment opportunity .... The discrimination Congress 
was concerned about ... is one stemming from ap imbalance of 
power and an abuse of that imbalance by the powerful which 
results in discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable 
group.»4 Both statements were ·offered to support the denial of 
sexual harassment actions brought under the sex discrimination 
provisions of Title VII.5 However, an important difference exists 
between the two cases from which the statements originated. In 
Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Tomkins n, the 
harassment occurred between a man and a woman;6 in Goluszek 
v. Smith, both parties were men.7 
1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (1994). 
2. Id. § 2000e-2(a). 
3. Tomkins v. Public Servo Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976) 
[hereinafter Tomkins 1]. 
4. Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. lli. 1988). 
5. Id.; Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 556. 
6. Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 555. 
7. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1453. 
1099 
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Why is the difference important? Because the theories 
presented in Tomkins I, which deny relief under federal law to 
women harassed by men, have long since been abandoned;8 
sexual harassment is now recognized as a form of sex 
discrimination under Title VII.9 However, same-sex sexual 
harassment, a topic virtually ignored during the development of 
the sexual harassment cause of action, has recently become the 
focus of controversy in federal COurtS,10 and has led to 
controversy reflected by a split in the federal courts over the 
actionability of same-sex sexual harassment under Title VIlll 
This Note will examine the same-sex sexual harassment 
conflict. Section. I will review the history of sexual harassment 
8. Tomkins v. Public Servo Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d. Cir. 1977) 
[hereinafter Tomkins 11] (reversing Tomkins I and holding that sexual harassment is 
actionable under Title VII). 
9. See Meritor Sav. Bank V. Vmson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (recognizing sexual 
harassment as an action under Title VII sex discrimination prohibitions). 
10. The first case to directly address same-sex sexual harassment did not appear 
until 1981. Wright V. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. m. 
1981) (holding that unwelcome sexual advances of a male homosexual IJUpervisor 
toward a male employee are actionable as sexual harassment under Title VII). The 
majority of cases addressing this issue, both reported and unreported, have arisen 
just since 1994. See, e.g., Quick V. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996); 
Garcia V. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994); McCoy v. Johnson 
Controls World Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Ga. 1995). In fact, of the many cases 
addressing same-sex sexual harassment, only four were decided prior to 1994. See 
Polly V. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 825 F. Supp. 135 (S.D. Tax. 1993); Goluszek 
V. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. ill 1988); Joyner V. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. 
Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983), affd, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright V. Methodist 
Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. ill 1981). 
11. Compare Oncale V. Sundowner Offshore Servo Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 119 (5th Cir. 
1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3432 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1996) (No. 96-568); 
Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451-52 (quoting accord Goluszek V. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 
1456 (N.D. Dl. 1988) ("Harassment by a male supervisor against a male subordinate 
does not state a claim under Title VII .... "»; Torres V. National Precision Blanking, 
943 F. Supp. 952, 958 (N.D. m. 1996); Schoiber V. Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 
730, 732 (N.D. Dl. 1996); Larry V. North Miss. Med. Ctr., 940 F. Supp. 960, 963 
(N.D. Miss. 1996); Benekritis V. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521, 525-26 (D.S.C. 1995); 
with Yeary V. Goodwill Indust.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 1997); 
Wrightson V. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e hold that 
a same-sex 'hostile work environment' sexual harassment claim may lie under Title 
VII .... "); Quick V. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996); Tanner V. Prima 
Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 354 <D. Nev. 1996); Raney V. District of 
Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 288 <D.D.C. 1995); EEOC V. Walden Book Co., 885 F. 
Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) ("Sexual harassment. . . by a homosexual 
supervisor of the same sex is an adverse employment action" under Title VII); Wright 
V. Methodist Youth Serv., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. m. 1981); and Marciano V. 
Kash n' Karry Foodstores, Inc., No. 94-1657CIV-T-17A, 1996 WL 420879, at *3 (M.D. 
Fla. July 1, 1996). 
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under Title VII, from early cases denying sexual harassment 
actions to the Supreme Court's ultimate recognition of sexual 
harassment as a form of sex discrimination. Section IT will 
survey the theories used by the federal courts to reject or support 
same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII by centering on the 
reasoning used by federal courts in deciding this issue. Finally, 
Section ill will analyze the viability of the courts' theories on 
same-sex sexual harassment in the context of history, statutory 
interpretation, and case law. 
I. THE HISTORY OF SEXUAL HARAsSMENT UNDER TITLE VII 
Although sexual harassment is not expressly' prohibited by 
Title VII,12 it is now recognized as a form of sex discrimination 
prohibited by the statute.13 Courts initially rejected sexual 
harassment claims brought under Title VII;14 these opinions 
cited both a lack of congressional intent to cover such cases15 
and a reluctance to involve the judiciary in personal 
relationships. IS Gradually, however, both the courts and the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission17 (EEOC) 
recognized the prohibition of sexual harassment under Title VII 
and have found that a person who makes unwelcome sexual 
advances or creates an offensive sexual atmosphere at work 
12. See 42 U.S.CoA § 2000e-2 (1994). 
13. Mentor Sav., 477 U.S. at 66 (holding that sexual harassment is actionable 
under the sex discrimination prohibitions of Title VII). 
14. See, e.g., Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 556 (D.N.J. 1976) (holding sexual 
harassment and sexual assault of female employee by male supervisor are not sex 
discrimination as defined by Title VIl), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Miller v. 
Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (holding employer was not 
liable under Title VII for dismissing a female employee who refused a male 
supervisor's sexual advances), rev'd on other grounds, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); 
Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 162 (D. Ariz. 1975) (stating that 
female employees' claims that their employment had been terminated for refusing a 
male supervisor's sexual advances are not cognizable under Title VII), vacated without 
opinion, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). 
15. See Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 556 ("[Title VIrs] aim is to make careers open 
to talents irrespective of . . . sex. It is not intended to provide a federal tort remedy 
for what amounts to physical attack motivated by sexual desire .... "). 
16. See Miller, 418 F. Supp. at 236 ("The attract10n of males to females and 
females to males is a natural sex phenomenon . . . • rut would seem wise for the 
Courts to refrain from delving into these matters ..•. "); Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163 
("By [the supervisor's] alleged sexual advances, [he] was satisfying a personal urge" 
and thus the employer is not liable). 
17. The EEOC is the federal agency charged by Congress with the enforcement of 
Title VII. 42 U.S.CoA § 2000e-5 (1994). 
3
Flynn: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment:  Sex, Gender and the Definition of Se
Published by Reading Room, 1997
HeinOnline -- 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1102 1996-1997
1102 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:1099 
imposes barriers to equal employment for one gender and not 
another.18 This recognition culminated with the Supreme 
Court's ruling in Mentor Savings Bank v. Vinson,19 stating that 
sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII.20 
A Legislative History 
Not only is sexual harassment not mentioned in Title VII's 
prohibitions, but language prohibiting discrimination on the basis 
of sex itself was a last-minute addition to the language of Title 
VII,21 which initially was intended primarily to protect against 
race discrimination in employment.22 This last-minute addition 
was apparently a humorous attempt to defeat the bill; the 
representative who proposed the amendment supported his 
purported concerns for the "minority sex" with a letter lamenting 
the dearth of marriageable men and requesting that government 
take action to amend the situation.23 This elicited an amused 
reaction from the House of Representatives.24 However, female 
Representatives rushed to support the amendment;25 they 
remarked upon the irony that those presenting the "sex" 
amendment were the most rabid opponents of a bill introduced 
months earlier requiring equal pay for women.26 
Despite the apparent attempt to defeat Title VII with the 
addition of protections against sex discrimination, the 
amendment passed on the day it was proposed.27 However, this 
18. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Sexual 
harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex 
is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial 
harassment is to racial equality."); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 
1044, 1048 (3d Cir. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976), 
rev'd 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978); EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of 
Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1994). 
19. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
20. Id. at 66. 
21. 110 CONGo REc. 2577 (1964). 
22. Id. at 2581; see also Dawn M. Buff, Note, Beyond the Court'c Standard 
Response: Creating an Effective Test for Determining Hostile Work Environment 
Harassment Under Title VII, 24 STETSON L. REv. 719, 725 (1995). 
23. 110 CONGo REc. 2577 (1964). The author of the letter takes the government to 
task for participating in wars that kill off "marriageable men," thus making them a 
scarce commodity. Id. 
24. Id. at 2578. 
25. Id. at 2578-83. 
26. Id. at 2581, 2584. 
27. Id. at 2584. 
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eleventh-hour addition allowed little discussion regarding 
Congress' intentions relating to sex discrimination.28 The dearth 
of legislative history on sex discrimination under Title VII thus 
offered little guidance to courts first determining whether sexual 
harassment claims were actionable under Title VII.28 
B. Early Cases Rejecting Sexual Harassment Actions Under Title 
VII 
When first asked to recognize sexual harassment claims under 
Title VII, most federal district courts refused to do SO.30 Their 
refusal was based upon the following concerns: (1) adoption of the 
theory that Title VII was never intended to extend to sexual 
harassment actions,31 (2) an unwillingness to intrude upon 
personal or private matters/2 and (3) a fear that allowing such 
actions would prompt a flood oflitigation.33 
As articulated in Tomkins 1,34 one basis for rejecting sexual 
harassment claims brought under Title VII was that Congress 
intended Title VII as a remedy for removing barriers to equal 
employment opportunities, not as a remedy to attacks based on 
sexual desire.35 In rejecting a sexual harassment action, the 
Tomkins I court found that, because the sexual advances were 
based on desire and not specifically on the gender of the victim, 
they were beyond the reach of Title VII's prohibitions against sex 
discrimination.36 
Rather than viewing sexual harassment as a sex-based barrier 
to employment opportunity, courts relied upon another theory 
that sexual harassment was really a "personal proclivity, 
peculiarity or mannerism" and an attempt to satisfy "a personal 
28. Mentor Sav., 477 U.S. at 64 ("[T]he bill quickly passed as amended, and we 
are left with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting [Title Vll's] 
prohibition against discrimination based on 'sex.' "). 
29. Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 234-35 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd on 
other grounds, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. 
Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated without opinion, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). 
30. Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D. N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d. Cir. 
1977); Miller, 418 F. Supp. at 236; Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163. 
31. Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 556; Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163. 
32. Miller, 418 F. Supp. at 236; Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163. 
33. Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 557; Miller, 418 F. Supp. at 236; Come, 390 F. 
Supp. at 163. 




Flynn: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment:  Sex, Gender and the Definition of Se
Published by Reading Room, 1997
HeinOnline -- 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1104 1996-1997
1104 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [V 01. 13:1099 
urge. ,,37 In the absence of employer policies approving of such 
sexual advances, the harassment was unrelated to the victim's 
employment,38 even though such behavior was distasteful and 
an unfortunate occurrence in the workplace.39 
Finally, early case law regarding sexual harassment 
demonstrates the courts' reluctance to intrude upon these 
personal incidents under the rationale that doing so would invite 
a flood of litigation.40 To allow sexual harassment claims under 
Title VII would turn every "pass" into a potential lawsuit;U 
would ignore the reality of natural sexual attraction between 
men and women,42 and would invite false claims of sexual 
advances as retaliation for negative employment decisions or 
discipline.43 
C. Early Acceptance Of Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title 
VII 
The refusal to recognize sexual harassment as actionable 
under Title VII was short-lived." Early cases allowing sexual 
harassment claims under Title VII did so under a different 
theory of Congressional intent: that unwelcome sexual advances 
and sexually offensive work environment created the barriers to 
employment, which Title VII was meant to eradicate.45 Also, 
courts voiced disapproval for the early theories rejecting sexual 
harassment claims, including the reluctance to get involved in 
personal matters45 and the fear of instigating massive case loads 
for COurtS.47 
37. Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 163; see also Miller, 418 F. Supp. at 236. 
38. Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 163. 
39. Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 556. 
40. Id. at 557; Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 163. 
41. Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 557; Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 163. 
42. Miller, 418 F. Supp. at 236. 
43. Id. 
44. Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. was the first reported case dealing with sexual 
harassment under Title VII. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D .. Ariz. 1975). The first case allowing 
sexual harassment actions under Title VII was decided in 1976. Williams v. Saxbe, 
413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd 587 F.2d l240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). By 1977, two 
Circuit Court of Appeals had followed suit. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977); Tomkins II, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). 
45. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 657-58; Barnes, 561 F.2d at 987; Tomkins II, 568 
F.2d at 1047 n.2. 
46. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 660. 
47. Id. at 660-61; Tomkins II, 568 F.2d at 1049. 
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Instead of excluding sexual harassment claims as beyond Title 
VII's scope and the intent of Congress, courts determined that 
prohibiting such behavior came squarely under Congress' intent 
to eradicate barriers in employment.48 Specifically, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that making sexual advances 
toward employees and requiring that they submit to such 
advances in order to remain or to advance in employment, 
imposes a condition of employment on one gender and not 
another.49 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals dubbed this 
construction of prohibited behavior under Title VII as the "but 
for" test-but for the gender of the victim, he or she would not be 
harassed. 50 
In response to the argument that sexual harassment was a 
personal matter into which the judiciary should not interfere, the 
D.C. District Court was the first to reject the notion that it was 
the victim's willingness (or lack thereof) to enter into such a 
personal relationship and respond to the sexual desires of the 
harasser rather than the victim's gender that was made a 
condition of employment.51 In Williams v. Saxbe,52 the court 
refused to give credence to this argument, stating that requiring 
such a choice of one gender rather than another in and of itself 
was prohibited conduct under Title VII.53 
Finally, the Circuit Courts of Appeal that first allowed sexual 
harassment claims under Title VII did so even in the face of 
possibly limitless litigation stemming from every initiation of 
social contact in the workplace.54 The Third Circuit stated the 
"congressional mandate that the federal courts provide relief is 
strong; it must not be thwarted by concern for judicial 
economy."55 The D.C. Circuit allowed that Congress may have 
48. Tomkins II, 568 F.2d at 1046-47 0.2; Barnes, 561 F.2d at 987; Williams, 413 F. 
Supp. at 657-58. 
49. Tomkins II, 568 F.2d at 1046-47. 
50. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 ("But for her womanhood, . . . her participation in 
sexual activity would never have been solicited. • . • [S]he became the target of her 
superior's sexual desires because she was a woman .... "). 
51. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 657-58. 
52. Id. at 654. 
53. Id. at 659. 
54. Tomkins II, 568 F.2d at 1049; see also Barnes, 561 F.2d at 994 0.81. 
55. Tompkins II, 568 F.2d at 1049. Indeed, it was the very strength of this 
mandate, and its remedial nature, which convinced courts that it was necessary to 
construe Title VII to prohibit sexual harassment implicitly. See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 
994; Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 658. 
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recognized this possibility when it acted to prohibit such 
discriminatory behavior.56 Moreover, the courts recognized that 
existing judicial procedures for weeding out bad faith or frivolous 
claims would act to prevent such a flood.57 
D. Expansion of Sexual Harassment Theory 
The earliest cases recognizing sexual harassment claims under 
Title VII involved situations in which an employee was 
threatened with adverse employment action absent submission to 
sexual demands.58 This type of sexual harassment is known as 
quid pro quo59 sexual harassment.60 In .1980, the EEOC issued 
guidelines defining what behavior constituted quid pro quo 
sexual harassment.61 However, the EEOC outlined another type 
of actionable sexual harassment beyond the quid pro quo action; 
this new cause of action was not previously acknowledged by the 
COurtS.62 The Guidelines prohibit conduct of a sexual nature that 
"has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an 
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive working environment.1163 
This new type of sexual harassment, known as "hostile 
environment harassment,"64 did not require that a tangible loss 
of job benefits must be suffered for liability under Title VII, as 
was required by quid pro quo harassment.65 The reasoning for 
56. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 994 n.81. 
57. Tomkins II, 568 F.2d at 1049. 
58. See Michelle Ridgeway Peirce, Note, Sexual Harassment and Title VJI-A Better 
Solution, 30 B.C. L. REv. 1071, 1081 (1989); Michael D. Vhay, Comment, The Harms 
of Asking: Towards A Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. Cm. L. 
REv. 328, 334 (1988). 
59. "Something for something." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1248 (6th ed. 1990). 
60. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vmson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). 
61. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(a)(I), 
(2) (1994). The Guidelines on quid pro quo harassment are as follows: 
Id. 
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of... Title VII. 
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal 
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when 
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a 
term or condition of an individual's employment, [or] (2) submission to or 
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for 
employment decisions affecting such individual. . . . 
62. Vhay, supra note 58, at 336. 
63. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1994). 
64. Meritor Sav., 477 U.S. at 65. 
65. Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective 
8
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 9
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol13/iss4/9
HeinOnline -- 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1107 1996-1997
1997] DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE vn 1107 
this extension was set forth by the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Bundy v. Jackson, the first court opinion to 
recognize a hostile work environment claim.66 There, the D.C. 
Circuit stated that the "psychological and emotional work 
environment" is considered part of the conditions of 
employment;67 sexual harassment that makes such an 
environment hostile and offensive for one gender and not for 
another would constitute discrimination on the basis of sex.68 In 
other words, whereas quid pro quo sexual harassment claims 
dealt with the loss or threat of a loss of a tangible job benefit, 
hostile environment sexual harassment claims focused on the loss 
of an intangible job benefit-a non-hostile, non-offensive 
psychological environment. 
In a span of six years, courts shifted from refusing to recognize 
sexual harassment claims under Title VII to extending the 
prohibitions to include not only direct actions taken against 
employees for refusing sexual advances, but also sexual conduct 
that would create a hostile work environment. This progression 
was ultimately ratified by the Supreme Court in its landmark 
decision, Mentor Savings Bank v. Vinson.69 
E. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 
The Supreme Court made it very clear that the sex 
discrimination provisions of Title VII prohibited sexual 
harassment: "Without question, when a supervisor sexually 
harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that 
supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex.n7O The Court 
acknowledged the actionability of both quid pro quo and hostile 
environment sexual harassment claims.71 The Court found, as 
Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 333, 341 (1990). 
66. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
67. Id. at 944-45. 
68. Id. at 945. This line of reasoning was also adopted in Henson v. City of 
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). In Henson, the court established a five-part 
test for hostile environment sexual harassment claims. Id. at 903-05. In order to 
bring a claim, a plaintiff has to demonstrate that: (I) he or she is a member of a 
protected class, that is, male or female; (2) "the employee was subject to unwelcome 
sexual harassment"; (3) but for the employee's sex, he or she would not have been 
harassed; (4) the harassment affected a condition of employment; and (5) the 
employer "knew or should have known of the harassment" and took no action. Id. 
69. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
70. Id. at 64 (emphasis added). 
71. Id. at 64, 66. 
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had courts in the early cases recognizing sexual harassment 
claims under Title VII,72 that sexual harassment acted as a 
barrier to equal employment opportunity in the workplace.73 It 
was Congress' intent to strike down these barriers in order " 'to 
strike at the entire spectrum. of disparate treatment of men and 
women' in employment."74 
Thus, Title VII has been extended to cover sexual harassment 
claims, despite the fact that it contains neither an express 
prohibition against sexual harassment nor even explicit mention 
of an intent to do so in the scarce legislative history that exists. 
In so extending Title VII, courts have stated the following: (1) 
that sexual harassment sets up barriers to equal employment, 
barriers which Congress intended to remove via Title VII;76 (2) 
that such barriers are sex discrimination because sexual 
harassment imposes a condition of employment on one gender 
and not another;76 (3) that there is a cause of action for hostile 
work environment sexual harassment as well as for quid pro quo 
actions;" and (4) that unwelcomeness is the essential element of 
sexual harassment actions under Title VII.78 
II. THE SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARAsSMENT CONFLICT 
While it is now well-settled that opposite-sex sexual 
harassment is prohibited by Title VII's sex discrimination 
provisions, a new controversy has recently arisen regarding 
same-sex sexual harassment-that is, situations in which the 
harasser and the harassee are of the same gender.79 The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has opined on the issue, flatly stating 
that Title VII does not apply to same-sex sexual harassment 
claims.80 The Fourth Circuit has rejected this absolute 
72. See, e.g., Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657-58 (D. D.C. 1976), rev'd 587 
F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
73. Mentor Sav., 477 U.S. at 67. 
74. Id. at 64 (citation omitted). 
75. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 657-58. 
76. Tomkins II, 568 F.2d 1044, 1046-47 (3d. Cir. 1977). 
77. Meritor Sav., 477 U.S. at 64, 66. 
78. Id. at 68. 
79. See Pamela J. White & Stephanie A Baldanzi, Same·Sex Sexual Harassment 
Now Unpredictable Area of Law, 4 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION REPoRTER 240 (Feb. 
22, 1995). 
80. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 119-20 (5th Cir. 1996), 
petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3432 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1996) (No. 96-568); Garcia v. 
Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994). 
10
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prohibition on same-sex sexual harassment claims under Title 
VII.sl However, when dealing with hostile environment claims, 
the Fourth Circuit, differentiating between situations involving 
homosexual harassers82 and those involving heterosexual 
harassers, has held that only in the first instances are sexual 
harassment claims actionable.83 The Sixth Circuit has similarly 
recognized that a same-sex sexual harassment claim resulting 
from the harassment of a homosexual supervisor is actionable, 
although it has thus far refused to draw the same heterosexual-
homosexual distinction as the Fourth Circuit.54 Finally, the 
Eighth Circuit has adopted a broader categorization of actionable 
same-sex sexual harassment claims under Title VII to include 
situations in which both the harasser and his or her victim are 
heterosexual.85 Four other Circuit Courts of Appeals have 
expressed in dicta a reluctance to exclude such claims from Title 
VII coverage.86 The remaining Circuit Courts of Appeals have so 
far been silent on the issue. Federal district courts are split on 
the issue, albeit not evenly;87 the majority of courts have 
81. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 1996). 
82. Id. 
83. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th Cir.), 
eert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996). Note, however, that the Circuit Court has not yet 
expressed an opinion on the actionability of same-sex quid pro quo claims, although it 
has indicated a willingness to hold them actionable. Id. at 1195 n.4. 
84. Yeary v. Goodwill Indust.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 1997). 
85. Quick. v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1996). 
86. Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) ("IWle do not 
mean to exclude the possibility that sexual harassment of . . . men by other men, or 
women by other women would not also be actionable in appropriate cases."); Steiner 
v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994), eert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 733 (1995) ("[W]e do not rule out the possibility that both men and women 
working at Showboat have viable claims against [a male] for sexual harassment."); 
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 n.11 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Except in the 
exceedingly atypical case of a bisexual supervisor, it should be clear that sexual 
harassment is discrimination based upon sex."); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 
n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (rejecting defense's argument that a man could make sexual 
advances toward a man as easily as toward a woman; "In each instance, the legal 
problem would be identical . . . the exaction of a condition which, but for his or her 
sex, the employee would not have faced."); see also Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 
597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983), affd, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984) (affirming 
without opinion the district court's recognition of a same-sex sexual harassment cause 
of action). 
87. See Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730, 737 <N.D. m. 1996) (holding 
that Garcia and the cases following its reasoning correctly interpreted Title vn as 
not covering same-sex sexual harassment claims); Larry v. North Miss. Med. Ctr., 940 
F. Supp. 960, 963 <N.D. Miss. 1996) (dismissing same-sex sexual harassment claim 
because bound by Fifth Circuit precedent); Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 
11
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allowed, or at least have recognized the viability of, same-sex 
sexual harassment claims under Title VII.BS The issue is so 
confused that the U.S. Supreme Court has requested that the 
U.S. Department of Justice submit a brief outlining its views on 
the actionability of same-sex harassment claims under Title 
VII.89 
Recognition of same-sex sexual harassment claims ranges from 
complete rejection of such claims to acceptance of same-sex 
claims on the same basis as opposite sex claims/a with several 
courts staking out the middle ground and only allowing certain 
such claims (for example, allowing only quid pro quo actions or 
factual scenarios involving homosexuals).91 Courts that flatly 
1546, 1548 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (following Garcia); Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 
521, 526 <D. S.C. 1995) (refusing to recognize same-sex sexual harassment claim 
under Title VII). 
88. See, e.g., McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., No. 5:94-CV-480-4(HL), 1997 WL 50037, 
at *6 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 1997) (allowing same-sex sexual harassment claims comports 
with Title VITs language and existing sexual harassment case law); Miller v. Vesta, 
Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 701 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 
1403, 1409 (E.D. Wis. 1996) ("[Slame-sex harassment claims are cognizable under 
Title Vll"); Gerd v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357 <D. Colo. 1996); 
Marciano v. Kash rr Karry Foodstores, Inc., No. 94-1657CIV-T-17A, 1996 WL 420879, 
at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. July 1, 1996) (holding hostile environment same-sex: sexual 
harassment cases are actionable under Title Vll; quid pro quo actions are not); 
Tietgen v. Browrrs Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1500 (E.D. Va. 1996) 
(holding Title Vll prohibits sexual harassment regardless of the "gender combination" 
of the parties involved); Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 
1996); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1104 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); 
Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., 94 CIV. 5458{LAP), 1995 WL 640502, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995) (holding same-sex sexual harassment to be actionable under 
Title Vll). 
89. Court Asks for Administration's View on Whether to RelJiew Same·Sex Issue, 7 
EMPL. DISCRIMINATION REP. 765 <Dec. 18, 1996). 
90. Compare Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(holding same-sex sexual harassment claims not actionable under Title VII) with 
Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding 
same-sex sexual harassment claims actionable under Title Vll, using the same 
elements of proof as opposite sex harassment cases). 
91. Compare McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996) (holding that hostile environment sexual 
harassment action where harasser and victim are both heterosexuals is not actionable 
under Title VII) with Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 
1996) (holding when harasser is homosexual, same-sex sexual harassment claim is 
actionable); see also Marciano v. Kash N' Karry Foodstores, Inc., No. 94-1657CIV-T-
17A, 1996 WL 420879, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 1, 1996) (allowing hostile environment, 
but not quid pro quo, same-sex sexual harassment cases under Title VII); 
Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'! Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (same-sex 
sexual harassment can only be actionable when anti-male or anti-female environment 
is created in the workplace). 
12
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reject all same-sex sexual harassment claims .do so on one theory: 
namely, that Congress intended Title VII as a tool to balance 
power inequalities in the workplace and never intended for same-
sex sexual harassment to come under that protection.92 
Courts that allow same-sex sexual harassment actions, all or 
in part, have reasoned by way of the following: (1) the plain 
language of both the statute and the Supreme Court's decision in 
Mentor Savings Bank v. Vinson do not restrict Title VII coverage 
to opposite sex situations;93 (2) the EEOC, as the appointed 
enforcer of Title VII, has interpreted the statute to allow same-
sex claims;94 (3) the "but-for" test established early in the 
history of sexual harassment law requires that harassment that 
an employee would not suffer but for his or her sex must be 
labeled sexual harassment, regardless of the harasser's gender;95 
(4) that dicta in the earliest sexual harassment cases implies 
such actions should be allowed;96 and (5) that theories currently 
accepted in sexual harassment law, including reverse 
discrimination and actions alleging other-than-sexual behavior, 
lead courts to hold that same-sex sexual harassment cannot be 
excluded from Title VII protection.97 
92. See Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451-52 (citing Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 
(N.D. m. 1988); Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. TIl. 1996); 
Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 493-94 CW.D. Wash. 1995); Benekritis v. 
Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521, 525-26 CD.S.C. 1995». 
93. See Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 702 CE.D. Wis. 1996); Johnson v. 
Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 CE.D. Wis. 1996); Tietgen v. Brown's 
Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1500 CE.D. Va. 1996); Williams v. 
District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. I, 7 CD.D.C. 1996); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & 
Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1136-37 (C.D. TIl. 1995). 
94. See Swage v. The Inn Phlla., Civ. A. No. 96-2380, 1996 WL 368316, at *2 (E.D. 
Pa. June 21, 1996); Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357 CD. Colo. 
1996); Ecklund v. Fruisz Tech., Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335, 337 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
95. Gerd, 934 F. Supp. at 361; Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 
286 (D.D.C. 1996); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 
1995), relJ'd 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996); Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc., 511 
F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. m. 1981). 
96. See Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1378 (C.D. Cal. 
1995); Griffith, 887 F. Supp. at 1136; Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. at 1102 n.3; 
Boyd v. Vonnahmen, No. 93-CV-4358-JPG, 1995 WL 420040 at *3 (S.D. TIl. Mar. 29, 
1995); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 
1995). 
97. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding 
sexual harassment claim does not have to involve behavior expressing sexual interest 
or requesting sexual favors to be actionable); Swage v. The Inn Phlla., Civ. A. No. 
96-2380, 1996 WL 368316, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1996) (holding it inconsistent to 
allow reverse discrimination cases but not same-sex sexual harassment cases); Easton, 
13
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A The Rejection of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims 
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North 
America,98 which reject same-sex sexual harassment claims,99 
has been cited as support by all later decisions also rejecting 
such claims.loo Unfortunately, the decision offers little to 
analyze on its face. The court's reasoning consists of two 
sentences: "[H]arassment by a male supervisor against a male 
subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII even though 
the harassment has sexual overtones. Title VII addresses gender 
discrimination."lol Such brevity frustrates an analysis of the 
holding, but there are two mitigating factors. First, Goluszek v. 
Smith,102 the authority cited by the Garcia court in support of 
its brief statement,l03 explains in greater detail what is meant 
by "gender discrimination. ,,104 Second, some district courts 
following the court's ruling have discussed their own reasoning in 
greater detail. lOS 
1. Goluszek v. Smith and the Imbalance of Power 
Goluszek v. Smith involved a hostile environment sexual 
harassment claim brought by a man whose co-workers 
commented incessantly about his supposed sexual inexperience 
and accused him of being a homosexual. lOG The court rejected 
905 F. Supp. at 1379 (reverse discrimination cases demonstrate that not only 
"minority" group entitled to protection under Title Vll). 
98. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994). 
99. Id. at 451-52. 
100. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 119 (5th Cir. 1996), 
petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3432 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1996) (No. 96-568); Schoiber v. 
Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730, 731 (N.D. ill 1996); Larry v. North· Miss. Med. 
Ctr., 940 F. Supp. 960, 963 (N.D. Miss. 1996); Ashworth v. Roundup Co.. 897 F. 
Supp. 489, 494 (W.D. Wash. 1995); Benekritis v. JohnEon, 882 F. Supp. 621, 526 
(D.S.C. 1995); Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (W.D. Tex. 1995). 
Note that in both Oncale and Larry, the courts seemed unenthusiastic about following 
Garcia, repeated several times that they were impelled to accept the Garcia decision 
as binding precedent, and cited to the extensive opposition in other COurt3 to the 
decision. See Oncale, 83 F.3d at 119-20; Larry, 940 F. Supp. 963-64. 
10L Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451-52 (citation omitted). 
102. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. ill 1988). 
103. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 452. 
104. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456. 
105. See, e.g., Schoiber, 941 F. Supp. at 737-39; Ashworth, 897 F. Supp. at 493; 
Benekritis, 882 F. Supp. at 525. 
106. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1453-54. 
14
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his claim under Title VII.107 The court's denial was based on its 
review of congressional intent in establishing the protections of 
Title VII.los Although the court recognized that the purpose of 
Title VII was to establish equal opportunity,109 as was 
established in earlier sexual harassment cases under Title 
VII,l1O it narrowly defined the means Congress intended to 
achieve that purpose.111 The Goluszek court stated that 
Congress' intent was to end discrimination based upon "an 
imbalance of power and an abuse of that imbalance by the 
powerful which results in discrimination against a discrete and 
vulnerable groUp."l12 The only authority the court cited for this 
proposition was a student-written Note;l13 it cited nothing from 
the statute itself, nor to any legislative history. 114 
Based upon this view of congressional intent, the court held 
that sexual harassment would not be actionable unless the 
harassment created an "anti-male environment" in which males 
were made to feel inferior because they are male.l15 Because 
the plaintiff in Goluszek was a male in a male-dominated 
environment, his workplace was not an "anti-male 
environment."116 The court recognized that the plaintiff, 
Goluszek, may have been the recipient of treatment to which 
women would not be subjected, and thus an argument could be 
made that he was harassed because he was male.117 However, 
because no anti-male environment resulted, the harassment was 
107. Id. at 1456. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Williams v. 
Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
111. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. (citing Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment 
Under Title VII, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1449, 1451-52 (1984». 
114. Id.; see also Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 704 (E.D. Wis. 1996) 
(noting lack of support in student-written note for Goluszek court's conclusions 
regarding legislative history for Title VlI); Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. 
Supp. 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 1996) (criticizing Goluszek court for supporting opinion with 
student Note rather than Congressional material); Ton v. Information Resources, Inc., 
No. 95 C 3565, 1996 WL 5322, at *7 (N.D. TIl. Jan. 3, 1996) (criticizing Goluszek for 
failure to find support in statute or legislative history); Raney v. District of Columbia, 
892 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1995) (criticizing Goluszek court for failing to cite to 
legislative history). 
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not actionable under Title VII, and thus Goluszek had no claim 
under Title VII.lls 
2. Garcia and Its Progeny 
In accepting Goluszek's holding without explication, the Fifth 
Circuit in Garcia reduced Goluszek's long discussion of 
congressional intent and the requirement of an anti-male 
environment to one phrase-"gender discrimination."1l9 Further 
discussion of Goluszek's theories did not occur until later opinions 
in agreement with the Garcia court were issued.120 These later 
opinions focused solely on the theory of congressional intent, 
stating that Congress intended to remedy only those situations in 
which disparate treatment in the form of an anti-male or anti-
female environment exists.121 These cases add no new support, 
whether from case law or legislative sources, for Goluszek's 
claims; they remain supported only by a student-written Note. 
However, the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits and many 
federal district courts have rejected Garcia's interpretation of 
congressional intent and instead have recognized that same-sex 
sexual harassment claims are or could be cognizable under Title 
VII.122 The decisions have varied significantly in outlining the 
types of same-sex claims that will be recognized,123 the 
elements that will constitute proof of a same-sex claim,124 and 
118. [d. 
119. Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 452 (5th Cir. 1994). 
120. See, e.g., Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 493 <W.D. Wash. 1995); 
Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521, 525 (D. S.C. 1995). 
121. See Ashworth, 897 F. Supp. at 493; Benekritis, 882 F. Supp. at 525. 
122. See, e.g., Yeary v. Goodwill Indust.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 
1997); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 1996); Quick v. 
Donaldson, 90 F.3d 1372, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1996); Marciano v. Kash n' Karry 
Foodstores, Inc., No. 94-1657ClV-T-17A, 1996 WL 420879, at ·3 (M.D. Fla. July 1, 
1996); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev. 1996); 
Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 288 (D.D.C. 1995); Griffith v. 
Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1136-37 (C.D. ill. 1995); EEOC v. Walden 
Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); McCoy v. Johnson Controls 
World Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995). 
123. E.g., compare McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 
1195 n.4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996) (declaring that hostile 
environment same-sex sexual harassment claims are not actionable under Title VII, 
but that quid pro quo same-sex sexual harassment claims are not ruled out) with 
Marciano, 1996 WL 420879, at ·3 (holding quid pro quo same-sex sexual harassment 
claims are not actionable under Title VII, but hostile environment same-Eex sexual 
harassment claims may be brought). 
124. E.g., compare Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elee. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 752 (4th 
16
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the behavior that will be prohibited by Title VII in the same-sex 
context.125 However, the courts have uniformly supported their 
decisions to allow these actions with the following: (1) citation to 
dicta in the earliest sexual harassment cases that implies such 
actions should be allowed;126 (2) utilization of the but for 
test,127 also established in the earliest sexual harassment 
cases;128 (3) reference to the plain language of Title VII and the 
gender-neutral language used by the Supreme Court in Mentor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson to establish the actionability of sexual 
harassment claims;129 and (4) deference to the EEOC's 
interpretation of Title VII, which allows for same-sex sexual 
harassment claims. 130 
B. The Acceptance of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Cases Under 
Title VII 
1. Quid Pro Quo, Hostile Environment, and Sexual Preference 
Although a majority of the circuit and district courts that have 
addressed the issue of same-sex sexual harassment have held it 
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996) (holding principle method of proving harasser 
targeted a victim because of sex: is proving harasser acted out of sexual attraction to 
the victim) with Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1996) 
(holding that sexual orientation of harasser not determinative of whether same-sex: 
sexual harassment claim is actionable). 
125. E.g., compare Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378-79 (holding that same-sex: sexual 
harassment action could exist for "bagging"-grabbing and squeezing of man's testicles 
by male co-workers) with McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1193, 1195 (finding no same-sex: 
sexual harassment claim between heterosexual men even where co-workers fondled 
victim's genitals and made other sexual contact). 
126. See Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1378 (C.D. Cal. 
1995); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (C.D. m. 1995); 
EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 n.3 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); Boyd v. 
Vonnahmen, No. 93-CV-435t.JFG, 1995 WL 420040 at *3 (S.D. lli. Mar. 29, 1995); 
McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (M.D. Ga. 1995). 
127. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
128. See Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D. Colo. 1996); 
Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1996); Walden Book Co., 
885 F. Supp. at 1102; Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 
(N.D. m. 1981). 
129. See Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Tietgen 
v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1500 n.9 (E.D. Va. 1996); 
Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1996); Griffith, 887 F. 
Supp. at 1136-37. 
130. See Swage v. The Inn Phila. No. Civ. A No. 96-2380, 1996 WL 368316, at *3 
(E.D. Pa. June 21, 1996); Gerd, 934 F. Supp. at 361; Ecklund v. Fruisz Tech., Ltd., 
905 F. Supp. 335, 337 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
17
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actionable under Title VII, no consensus exists as to whether all 
types of same-sex claims are included. For example, in 
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors,'m the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals examined the sexual harassment 
claim of a heterosexual male against several of his male co-
workers.132 Mr. McWilliams complained that his co-workers 
asked him about his sexual activities, once placed a condom in 
his food, exposed their genitalia to him, and fondled his 
genitals.133 However, Mr. McWilliams never claimed nor 
presented evidence that those accused were homosexual. 1M In 
dismissing Mr. McWilliams' claims, the court held that hostile 
environment same-sex sexual harassment claims are not 
actionable under Title VII.135 In support of this ruling, the 
court, citing the language of Title VII, stated that the activities 
alleged by Mr. McWilliams could not have been directed at him 
because of his sex.136 Instead, they were perhaps based upon his 
sensitivity or the vulgar nature of his tormentors.137 To allow 
such claims would expand Title VII's protections beyond the 
intent of Congress and the Supreme Court to include broad 
protection of "the sensibilities of workers simply 'in matters of 
sex.' "138 
Marciano v. Kash N Karry Foodstores, Inc.139 presented an 
alternative theory for determining which types of same-sex 
sexual harassment actions may be brought. In Marciano,l40 the 
alleged harasser, a male supervisor, exposed his genitals to Mr. 
Marciano, made vulgar comments regarding oral sex, and told 
131. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.· Ct. 72 (1996). 
132. Id. at 1193. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 1195. 
135. Id. The court expressly stated, however, that it was not addressing whether the 
homosexuality of any of the parties would allow a hostile environment action to be 
brought, or whether a quid pro quo action would be actionable regardless of the 
parties' sexual orientation. Id. at 1195 n.4. This issue was later addres£led by the 
Fourth Circuit in Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., in which the court held that 
same-sex: sexual harassment claims based on the actions of homosexual harassers 
were actionable. 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 1996). 
136. McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195-96. 
137. Id. at 1196. 
138. Id.; see also Gibson v. Tanks Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1107, 1108 (M.D.N.C. 1996) 
(holding no hostile environment same-sex: sexual harassment claim where both parties 
are heterosexual). 
139. No. 94-1657-CIV-T-17A, 1996 WL 420879 (M.D. Fla. July 1, 1996). 
140. Id. at *1. 
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Mr. Marciano he had a "cute butt."141 Mr. Marciano also 
claimed that the harasser's actions were proof that the harasser 
was homosexual, which made his conduct actionable under Title 
VII under McWilliams.l42 However, the court held, contrary to 
McWilliams' holding, that the harasser's sexual orientation was 
irrelevant in determining whether sexual harassment is 
actionable under Title VII.I43 In so holding, the court 
differentiated between hostile environment and quid pro quo 
sexual harassment actions. 1M The court stated that hostile 
environment sexual harassment actions were intended to ensure 
employee access to a workplace free of discrimination or 
harassment based on their gender and, thus, sexual orientation 
is irrelevant.l45 However, with quid pro quo same-sex actions, 
discrimination results when a claimant does not share a 
homosexual supervisor's sexual preference; the discrimination 
would be then based on sexual orientation rather than sex.l45 
Such discrimination would not be actionable under Title VII.147 
These two examples demonstrate the wide variance in the types 
of actions courts have (or have not) found actionable in same-sex 
sexual harassment litigation under Title VII. 
2. Elements of Proof 
Courts recognizing same-sex sexual harassment claims also 
differ in their approaches to the level and elements of proof 
necessary to prove such claims. These different evidentiary 
standards focus on (1) the role sexual attraction plays in proving 
that the harassment occurs because of the victim's sex;l48 (2) 
the necessity of proving an environment generally hostile to a 
141. 1d. 
142. 1d. at *2. 
143. 1d. at *3. 
144. 1d. 
145. 1d. 
146. 1d. The court does not address the question of whether a quid pro quo claim 
would be valid if the victim of a homosexual harasser was also homosexual. 
147. 1d.; see DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & TeL Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(holding sexual orientation discrimination not actionable under Title VII); Dillon v. 
Frank, No. 9O-CV-70799-DT, 1990 WI. 358586 CE.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 1990), aff'd 952 
F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding no action for sex: discrimination under Title VII 
where claimant harassed based on sexual orientation). 
148. See Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 752 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996); Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 
(D.D.C. 1996). 
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gender;l49 and (3) the sexual nature of the conduct of the 
harasser, which shall be discussed in the context of prohibited 
behavior under Title VII.15O The role sexual attraction plays in 
finding Title VII same-sex sexual harassment is closely related to 
the theories presented in the preceding cases regarding the effect 
of a harasser's sexual preference on the actionability of a claim, 
in that the discussions of proof and actionability accompany each 
other. lSI 
In Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 152 the court 
discussed the proof necessary to show that same-sex sexual 
harassment has occurred "because of' sex.153 The court case 
contrasted opposite-sex sexual harassment claims, in which the 
victim is presumed to be the focus of a heterosexual harasser's 
actions because of his or her sex, with same-sex sexual 
harassment cases, in which such conduct is usually not motivated 
by sex. 1M These presumptions stem from society's knowledge of 
the "realit[ies of] sexual conduct."155 Because of this lack of 
presumption in same-sex cases, the victim must prove that he 
was harassed because of his sex.156 The court states, "The 
principal way in which this burden may be met is with proof that 
the harasser acted out of sexual attraction .... "157 
Several courts have rebutted the assumption that sexual 
attraction is a necessary element of proof in same-sex sexual 
harassment cases. In Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, 
149. Compare Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'! Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1182 <N.D. 
Ind. 1995} (holding that clajmant must establish either an anti-male or anti-female 
environment) with Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357, 360-61 (D. 
Colo. 1996) (holding that work environment does not have to be hostile to all 
members of sex, just to individual plaintiff, to be actionable). 
150. Compare Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(holding harasser's conduct does not have to express sexual interest in or request 
sexual favors from victim) with Gerd, 934 F. Supp. at 361 (asking whether conduct is 
sexual in nature to determine whether same-sex harassment is actionable as sex 
discrimination under Title Vll). 
151. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 
n.5 (4th Cir. 1996). 
152. 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996). 
153. Ill. at 752. 
154. Ill. 
155. Ill. 
156. Ill. (emphasis added). 
157. Ill.; see also Shermer v. lllinois Dept. of Transp., 937 F. Supp. 781 (C.D. m. 
1996) (recognizing difficulty in meeting burden of proof in same-sex sexual 
harassment cases without proof of sexual attraction). 
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Inc./58 the court acknowledged that a same-sex sexual 
harassment plaintiff might fail to allege sufficient facts required 
to state a case that he had been discriminated against on the 
basis of gender; however, it also rejected the argument that the 
plaintiff had to prove the harasser's sexual attraction to him. The 
court stated that in this case the facts as alleged could be 
sufficient to support the plaintiffs claim without such proof.159 
Similarly, in Swage v. The Inn Philadelphia,l60 the court 
refused to hold that a same-sex sexual harassment plaintiff 
would be unable to prevail in the absence of proof of the 
harasser's sexual orientation.161 
In Goluszek, discussed above, the court rejected a same-sex 
sexual harassment claim on the basis that the objectionable 
conduct did not result in an anti-male environment.162 It held 
that such an environment was necess~ to establish a claim 
under Title VII, which Congress enacted to rectify inequalities 
and remove "discriminatory intimidation."l63 Some courts that 
have rejected Goluszek to find that same-sex sexual harassment 
is actionable under Title VII have still incorporated the "anti-
male environment" test as an element of same-sex claims.l64 
Other courts, however, including the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, have rejected the requirement that the harassment 
must create an anti-male or -female environment. In Quick v. 
Donaldson Co., 165 the court stated, "Protection under Title 
VII ... extends to all employees and prohibits disparate 
treatment of an individual, man or woman, based on that 
person's sex. The district court therefore erred in requiring ... 
evidence of an anti-male or predominantly female work 
158. 921 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
159. Id. at 1502. The plaintiff's complaint thus withstood a motion to dismiss. Id. 
160. Civ. A. No. 96-2380, 1996 WL 368316 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1996). 
161. Id. at *4. 
162. Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Dl. 1988); see discussion 
supra Part II.A.1. 
163. Id. 
164. See, e.g., Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805, 808 (N.D. Ind. 
1995) (acknowledging it would be "Id]ifficult, but not impossible" to prove that same-
sex sexual harassment resulted in necessary anti-male environment to state a Title 
VII claim); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'! Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1182 (N.D. Ind. 
1995) (recognizing that same-sex sexual harassment might be actionable under Title 
VII and requiring that an anti-male or anti-female environment be established for 
same). 
165. 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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environment."l66 Some courts have thus held that, based on 
Title VII's creation of individual claims for discrimination, 
requiring a showing of hostility to all members of a gender would 
be unwarranted.167 
3. Prohibited Behavior in Same-Sex Sexual Harassment 
Claims 
There is little argument among the cases allowing same-sex 
sexual harassment actions that quid pro quo same-sex 
harassmentl68 is actionable under Title VII.169 However, same-
sex sexual harassment claims often concern vulgarity and sexual 
taunting between men that is unrelated to any sort of sexual 
desire; rather, it reflects the sort of uninhibited, coarse behavior 
found in settings completely dominated by one gender. 170 
Nonetheless, the targets of this behavior may well be treated 
differently than if they were women; but for their gender, they 
would not be the brunt of this type of harassment.171 Because of 
this unique situation, the question arises whether same-sex 
sexual harassment must be "sexual" in nature, in that the object 
is to express sexual interest or to request sexual favors, in order 
to be actionable under Title VII. 172 In opposite-sex sexual 
166. 1d. at 1378 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
167. 1d.; see also Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357, 360-61 (D. 
Colo. 1996); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Nev. 
1996); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1995). 
168. These quid pro quo actions would include instances in which a man makes 
sexual demands on a male employee and conditions that person's employment on 
submitting to such demands. 
169. In fact, the earliest cases recognizing same-sex: sexual harassment as a 
co~le claim under Title vn were quid pro quo cases. See Joyner v. AM Cooper 
Transp., 597 F. Supp. ~37 (M.D. Ala. 1983), affd, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984); 
Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. ID. 1981). 
170. See, e.g., Shermer v. illinois Dept. of Transp., 937 F. Sup. 781 (C.D. ID. 1996) 
(finding defendant accused plaintiff on an all-male work crew of having sexual 
relations with other men); Gero, 934 F. Supp. at 357 (finding male co-workers groped 
and teased plaintiff about sex: life); Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 
1368 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding female supervisors spoke of sexual matters and 
exposed their bodies to female employees); Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 
(N.D. ill. 1988) (finding male co-workers teased employee about his sex: life). 
171. See, e.g., Quick, 90 F.3d at 1374 ("bagging" or groping of genitalia was not 
inflicted on female employees); Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456 (finding employer 
would have taken action in response to a complaint of sexual harassment from a 
female, unlike plaintiff's situation). 
172. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1996); Gerd, 934 
F. Supp. at 361. 
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harassment cases, non-sexual behavior that is nonetheless 
intimidating or hostile to one sex has been declared actionable as 
sexual harassment under Title VII on the theory that such 
treatment singles out one gender for poor treatment.173 The 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that likewise behavior 
does not have to be sexual in nature to be actionable in applying 
this rule to same-sex sexual harassment claims.17• 
However, most courts have not ruled specifically on whether 
conduct must be sexual in nature to be actio~able.175 Rather, 
they have looked to the sexual nature of the conduct to determine 
whether it is the sort of vulgar treatment between membei's of 
the same sex that, while sexual in content, is not meant to 
express sexual desire.176 Such conduct targets the victim 
because of personal dislike,l77 the victim's sensitivity or 
vulnerability,178 or the vulgarity of the harasser/79 but not 
because of the victim's sex; thus, Title VII does not apply. 
C. Theoretical Underpinnings of the Recognition of Same-Sex 
Sexual Harassment Actions Under Title VII 
The roots upon which acceptance of same-sex sexual 
harassment claims are based can be traced to the original cases 
recognizing the actionability of sexual harassment;l8O these 
cases acknowledged in dicta that same-sex actions might be 
allowed under Title VII.lB1 In Barnes v. Costle,182 for example, 
173. Gus v. Hall Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988). 
174. Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378-79. 
175. However, one case has held that the "determinative inquiry is solely whether 
the conduct is sexual in nature" and whether it would have occurred but for the 
victim's sex. Gerd, 934 F. Supp. at 361. 
176. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (holding 
insults with sexual overtones are based on animosity, not sex, and are not severe 
enough to allow an action under Title Vll); Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 
F. Supp. 1368, 1384 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding a person who finds sexually charged 
atmosphere oppressive because not comfortable with sexuality being openly expressed 
does not entail a violation of Title Vll). 
177. Johnson, 940 F. Supp. at 1411. 
178. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 70 (1996). 
179. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996). 
180. See, e.g., Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1502 
n.16 (E.D. Va. 1996); Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 
1996); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1101 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (all 
citing Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977». 
181. See Barnes v. Castle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that 
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the defendants argued that sexual harassment was not sexual 
discrimination, because such behavior would not be actionable if 
directed against those of the harasser's gender.l83 Disagreeing, 
the court stated that even if the parties were of the same gender, 
the harassment would not have occurred but for the gender of 
the victim.184 
This but for test has thus been utilized since to support actions 
for same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII. ISS For 
example, in Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, Inc./86 the 
district court allowed a quid pro quo action for same-sel~ sexual 
harassment.1B7 Using the but for test, the court reasoned that 
the plaintiff would not have been the object of his supervisor's 
sexual advances had he been of a different gender.l88 Thus, but 
for his gender, the advancements would not have been made.l89 
In a hostile environment case, Ecklund v. Fruisz Technology, 
Ltd.,190 the court found that the female plaintiff had been the 
object of a female co-worker's harassm~nt, including the use of 
sexual language and touching the plaintiff, because she was 
female; "but for" her sex, she would not have been the target.191 
Courts allowing same-sex sexual harassment claims under 
Title VII also have relied upon a plain language argument, which 
refers to both the language used by Congress in the statute as 
well as the language used by the Supreme Court in Meritor 
Savings192 to establish conclusively an action for sexual 
same-sex sexual harassment would still involve "the exaction of a condition which, 
but for his or her sex, the employee would not have faced."); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 
F. Supp. 654, 659 n.6 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("[A] 
finding of discrimination [could] be made if the supervisor were a homosexual."). 
182. Bames, 561 F.2d at 983. 
183. Id. at 990 n.55. 
184. Id. 
185. See, e.g., Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1995); 
EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); Pritchett v. 
Sizeler Real Estate Management Co., No. 93-2351, 1995 WL 241855 (E.D. La. Apr. 
25, 1995); Boyd v. Vonnahmen, No. 93-CV-435s.JPG, 1995 WL 420040, at ·2-3 (S.D. 
TIl. Mar. 29, 1995); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 
(S.D. Ga. 1995). 
186. 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. TIl. 1981). 
187. Id. at 310. The plaintiff alleged he was terminated as a result of his rejection 
of his homosexual male supervisor's advances. Id. at 308. 
188. Id. at 310. 
189. Id. 
190. 9~5 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
191. Id. at 339. 
192. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (E.D. Wis. 1996); 
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harassment. Some courts have stated that there is nothing in the 
language of Title VII indicating that Congress intended to 
restrict sexual harassment actions to opposite-sex situations.193 
Some courts also cite the language used by the Supreme Court in 
Mentor Savings194. to support same-sex sexual harassment 
claims because the Court was careful to use gender-neutral 
terminology and did not limit its holding to opposite-sex 
situations.195 In addition, the Court expressed a desire to reach 
the "entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women 
in employment."196 
Finally, courts also defer to the EEOC's interpretation of Title 
VII to allow same-sex sexual harassment claims.197 The EEOC 
has been given authority by Congress to implement and enforce 
Title VII, and as such, its interpretations of Title VII's coverage 
are persuasive authority.198 The EEOC has stated in its 
Compliance Manual that harassers and victims do not have to be 
of different sexes and that same-sex sexual harassment is 
actionable under Title VII.199 
In summary, the lone congressional intent theory used by some 
courts to deny same-sex sexual harassment claims contrasts with 
the attempts of other courts to use combinations of theories to 
fashion an action for same-sex sexual harassment claims under 
Title VII. These theories include the following: (1) the dicta 
Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1500 (E.D. Va. 
1996); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1995); Griffith v. 
Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1136-37 (C.D. ill. 1995); EEOC v. Walden 
Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1995). 
193. Griffith, 887 F. Supp. at 1136-37; see also McCoy v. Johnson Controls World 
Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995) ("[T]he plain language of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2 does not limit Title VII to heterosexual harassment.") 
194. An example of this gender-neutral language: "[W]hen a supervisor sexually 
harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 
'discriminate[sl' on the basis of sex." Mentor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 
(1986) (citation omitted). 
195. See Raney, 892 F. Supp. at 287; McCoy, 878 F. Supp. at 232; Walden Book Co., 
885 F. Supp. at 1102. 
196. Meritor Sav., 477 U.S. at 64 (citations omitted). This language was cited by the 
court in Raney to support a broad interpretation of the scope of Title VII to include 
same-sex sexual harassment claims. 892 F. Supp. at 287. _ 
197. See, e.g., Swage v. The Inn Phila., Civ. A. No. 96-2380, 1996 WL 368316, at *2 
(E.D. Pa. June 21, 1996); Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357, 361 
(D. Colo. 1996); Ecklund v. Fruisz Tech., Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335, 337 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
198. See Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev. 
1996). 
199. EEOC COMPL. MAN. (BNA) § 615.2. 
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supporting same-sex claims in early cases establishing sexual 
harassment as a cause of action under Title VII; (2) the but for 
test, which provides that discrimjnatory conduct that would not 
occur but for the victim's sex is actionable under Title VII; (3) the 
plain language of both Title VII and the Supreme Court's opinion 
in Mentor Savings, which lack any indicia that same-sex 
harassment claims are not actionable under Title VII; and (4) the 
EEOC's interpretation of Title VII favoring same-sex sexual 
harassment claims. An analysis of these theories in light of the 
historical development of sexual harassment law will 
demonstrate that courts allowing same-sex sexual harassment 
claims have chosen the better-reasoned course. 
m. HISTORICAL SUPPORT FOR SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARAsSMENT 
Although the Fifth Circuit in Garcia held that congressional 
intent to balance power relationships in the workplace would not 
admit same-sex sexual harassment actions into Title VII's circle 
of coverage,200 this view is not supported by the plain language 
of the statute, the legislative history of its passage, the earlier 
cases recognizing sexual harassment claims under Title VII, or 
under the Supreme Court's acknowledgment of sexual 
harassment as actionable under Title VII in Mentor Savings.201 
Ai!, noted by courts allowing same-sex sexual harassment 
claims under Title VII, no language in the statute prohibits its 
application to same-sex claims.202 Therefore, there is no clear 
statutory bar to allowing same-sex sexual harassment claims 
under Title VII. Because of the nature of the amendment process 
by which "sex" was added to Title VII protected groups,203 
legislative history as to Congress' intent with respect to same-sex 
sexual harassment offers little guidance. The scant historical 
guidance that does exist does not support the Goluszek theory of 
Title VII's "balancing of power" purpose.2M Rather, it seems 
200. Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 452 (5th Cir. 1994). 
201. 477 u.s. 57, 64, 66 (1986). 
202. Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Tietgen v. 
Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1500 (E.D. Va. 1996); Griffith 
v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. ll33, ll36-37 (C.D. lli. 1995); McCoy v. 
Johnson Controls World Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995). 
203. See generally llO CONGo REc. 2577-2584 (1964). 
204. See Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 286-87 (D.D.C. 1995) 
(noting that Goluszek court cited to no congressional record for its support of its 
theory of congressional intent, but instead cited to a student-written Note). 
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that the congressional intent theory offered by many courts 
allowing same-sex claims of sexual harassment is the better 
interpretation based on what little can be gleaned from the 
legislative history; such courts point to the language of the 
statute itself to find that Congress intended to reach all 
"disparate treatment of men and women.~ This position is 
bolstered by the EEOC's congressionally mandated interpretation 
of Title VII to cover same-sex sexual harassment claims.206 
ffistorical sexual harassment case law also supports such a 
conclusion. The early cases allowing sexual harassment under 
Title VII clearly recognized both the possibility and the 
appropriateness of same-sex sexual harassment cases being 
brought under Title VII.207 These decisions also recognized the 
but for test relied upon by cases allowing same-sex sexual 
harassment.208 In addition, the Supreme Court stated in 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson209 that it was Congress' intent 
that Title VIPs protections extend across a broad sweep of 
"disparate treatment of men and women.n210 Moreover, the 
court also carefully used gender-neutral language in defining 
sexual harassment under Title VII's sex discrimination 
provisions.211 Thus, as stated in cases upholding the viability of 
same-sex sexual harassment claims, Title VII cannot be read to 
apply to only opposite sex sexual harassment claims.212 
205. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vmson, 477 u.s. 57, 64 (1986). 
206. See, e.g., Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev. 
1996). 
207. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 
413 F. Supp. 654, 659 n.6 (D.D.C. 1976). 
208. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Raney 
v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1995); EEOC v. Walden Book 
Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate 
Management Co., No. 93-2351, 1995 WL 241855 (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 1995); Boyd v. 
Vonnahmen, No. 93·CV-4358-JPG, 1995 WL 420040, at *2-3 (S.D. TIl. Mar. 29, 1995); 
McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995); 
Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. lli. 1981). 
209. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
210. Id. at 64. 
211. Id. 
212. Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D. D.C. 1995); McCoy v. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although sex was added as a protected group to Title VII as a 
mere afterthought (and probably as a ploy to defeat Title VII), 
and although Title VII does not explicitly include sexual 
harassment, courts today recognize that both quid pro quo and 
hostile environment sexual harassment claims are actionable 
under Title VII. Same-sex sexual harassment has only recently 
been suggested as a controversial expansion to sexual 
harassment law. Proponents of the expansion seek recognition 
under the same theories of sexual harassment used in cases 
dealing with members of the opposite sex. 
Some courts hold that same-sex sexual harassment is not 
actionable under Title VII because Congress intended the statute 
to equalize power relationships in the workplace between 
members of the opposite sex. However, the more correct view, 
based upon the plain language of the statute, early case law 
interpreting Title VII to cover sexual harassment claims, the 
Supreme Court's language in the landmark case of Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson, and the EEOC's interpretation of Title 
VII, clearly allows same-sex sexual harassment claims to be 
brought under Title VII. 
Katherine H. Flynn 
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